"Two individuals have before them several possible contractual agreements. Both have interests in reaching agreement but their interests are not entirely identical. What will be the agreed contract, assuming that both parties behave rationally?"
While prior work has accepted that negotiators might not reach agreement because they either lack or fail to identify a positive zone of agreement, it always happened despite the interests both negotiators had in reaching an agreement.
In this research, we want to challenge this ubiquitous assumption in the negotiation and bargaining literature. Rather than assuming that both parties have "interests in reaching agreement" we will demonstrate that negotiators sometimes have ulterior motives for entering negotiations. For example, a negotiator may enter negotiations with the goal of stalling for time, creating a cooperative impression on a third party, or learning information from a counterpart. We introduce the term instrumental negotiations to characterize this type of bargaining situation. As opposed to sincere negotiations in which all parties are interested in reaching an agreement, in this paper, the word "instrumental" expresses negotiations that are used to achieve an objective other than reaching a deal and so it usually involves an intentional misdirection.
As a first step, we developed a game theoretic model that included the opportunity to engage in instrumental negotiations. The results from our theoretical analysis present us with several important hypotheses concerning the use of instrumental negotiations in practice. We summarize below the key results from the theory, which we plan to test in a laboratory experiment.
Hypothesis 1 [Existence of instrumental negotiations]
Introducing the possibility of instrumental negotiations will lead negotiators to engage in them. As a consequence we will observe that:
1. People choose to act instrumentally, 2. People can effectively succeed in such negotiations.
Hypothesis 1 pertains to (i) the occurrence of instrumental negotiations and (ii) the impact of such negotiations on the payoffs of the parties involved. Although both prior theoretical and experimental research have assumed that negotiators have good intentions, our model predicts that given the option, negotiators do engage in instrumental negotiations. Further, we expect the use of instrumental negotiations to be widely prevalent in contexts where one player can gain more from being instrumental than from negotiating sincerely.
Hypothesis 2 [Rejection rates]
The possibility of instrumental negotiations increases the rates of rejection of overtures.
Hypothesis 3 [Welfare]
The possibility of instrumental negotiations harms joint welfare as well as each party individually.
Hypotheses 2 and 3 also follow directly from the model. Hypothesis 2 predicts that the knowledge that negotiators could possibly be instrumental leads their counterparts to be cautious, and hence rebuff overtures more frequently. Further, more rejections will lead to lower rates of agreement and consequently to Pareto-inferior outcomes, since many sincere overtures will be rejected as well. Following the results of the analytical model, Hypothesis 3 predicts that the payoffs of each party to the negotiation, as well as the total welfare, will decrease when opportunities (or rather, threats) of instrumental negotiations exist.
